

DOES INTEREST GROUP SUPPORT MOVE BILLS TOWARDS LAW?

Matt Grossmann

Kurt Pyle

Department of Political Science
Michigan State University

Abstract:

Theories of how a bill becomes a law emphasize the role of committees and legislators. We ask whether interest groups play a role. We study more than 17,000 bills introduced in both houses of the 106th and 107th Congresses, including 196 with an associated interest group coalition and 552 that involved related lobbying. We analyze whether bills are reported from committee and pass each chamber, assessing the influence of committee membership, party, ideology, and cosponsors as well as interest group coalitions and lobbying. We find that interest group coalitions and lobbying have little influence on the advancement of legislation.

How does a bill become a law? In the classic version of events, made famous by Schoolhouse Rock's "I'm Just a Bill," a Member of Congress responds to a constituent idea by introducing a bill. The bill makes it out of committee if a few key Members reach agreement and it passes each chamber if it has majority support. Interest groups and lobbyists are nowhere to be found. According to some popular reports, this is no longer realistic: the new approach to moving legislation forward involves gathering interest group supporters and hoping for help from lobbyists.¹

Three recent examples indicate that policymakers believe obtaining support from interest groups is an important task on the road to a bill becoming law. First, lawmakers working on the latest round of health care reform gathered dozens of interest groups to try to reach agreement on a proposal before introducing a bill in Congress. Pear (2009) reports that AARP, the AFL-CIO, the American Medical Association, the American Cancer Society, the National Federation of Independent Business, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce all were asked to attend group discussions designed to cement a broad coalition behind the legislation; Members of Congress wanted to address their concerns in order to introduce a bill that already had interest group support.

Second, as President Obama signed the economic stimulus package, he told the audience: "It is the product of broad consultations – and the recipient of broad support – from business leaders, unions, and public interest groups, the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, Democrats and Republicans, mayors as well as governors."² Obama wanted to highlight support from interest groups as well as elected officials and to signal support from groups that are traditionally allied with Republicans.

Third, President Obama used a White House summit on fiscal responsibility to gather dozens of interest groups to solicit ideas on deficit control and entitlement spending. The list of

¹ For example, see media reports covering environmental legislation, such as Kays (1995).

² An online transcript is available at <<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/us/politics/17text-obama.html>>. Accessed 3/5/08.

attendees included unions, health care associations, ethnic and religious groups, business interests, and think tanks.³ Interest groups thus make appearances before any legislation has been developed, during the crucial writing stages, and after the bill has been signed into law. Interest groups are seen as necessary partners in moving issues up the legislative agenda, potential roadblocks to legislative success that should be satisfied, and signals of consensus worthy of thanks as victory is achieved.

Yet the inclusion of interest groups in the legislative process does not automatically indicate that they are necessary or even helpful in moving bills toward laws. We need to ask whether interest group support moves bills along in the legislative process. Does compiling a list of supportive groups help bills avoid death in Congressional committees? Does it help bills win votes on the floor of either chamber? Does it matter whether groups are actively lobbying for or against the legislation? We investigate these questions using new data on interest group coalitions and lobbying in support of or opposition to legislation in the 106th and 107th Congresses. Among the more than 17,000 bills introduced, did bills with interest group support or lobbying make it further? If interest group coalitions and lobbying are important in driving legislative action, our textbook understanding of how a bill becomes a law is incomplete. If supportive interest groups are not moving bills forward, we are left with the question of why policymakers pursue interest group support.

How a Bill Becomes a Law

The question of which factors systematically improve the prospects of a given bill becoming law has received long-running attention but has produced few consistent findings. The lack of results is somewhat surprising, given the obvious importance of legislation within Congress. The most common studies of legislation focus on roll call floor votes. Yet roll call votes are rarely a good

³ A list of attendees is available at: <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/first100days/2009/02/23/raw-data-special-interests-dominate-fiscal-responsibility-summit/> Accessed 25 February 2009.

indicator of legislative success because reaching the floor is the step in the legislative process where most bills are excluded and many important laws are enacted without roll call votes (see Clinton and Lapinski 2008). The other traditional focus of the literature has been on the capacity of individual legislators to advance their legislation, with their “success rate” the important unit of interest (e.g. Matthews 1959). Aided by the introduction of a new dataset via the *Congressional Bills Project*, however, recent research has shifted to consider the bill itself as the unit of analysis and focusing on the advancement of bills through the legislative process.

Measuring the progress of legislation, however, yields many potential indicators of success. The process by which a bill becomes a law contains numerous steps and therefore many possible stages at which to judge success. Legislation can be judged by whether a bill receives consideration, whether it is reported from committee, or whether it becomes law, among several other options. Given that only a small minority of bills ever passes beyond the committee stage, this choice has significant implications for judging the success of Members of Congress in passing their legislation. Similarly, counting the number of bills that pass rather than a ‘batting average’ of success based on the number of bills introduced (see e.g. Moore and Thomas 1991) can lead to different findings.

Despite these measurement difficulties, one finding is clear: bills introduced by members of the majority party are more likely to pass (Franzitch 1979; Moore and Thomas 1991; Anderson et al. 1991; Krutz 2005). Beyond this fact, though, conclusions are murky. Indeed, Adler and Wilkerson (2005) find that this majority success finding extends only to “discretionary” bills. Many additional attributes of the bill’s sponsor have also been examined with regards to legislative success. The ideology of a legislator, both in an absolute sense (e.g. Matthews 1959; Olson and Nonidez 1972) and in comparison to party and chamber medians (e.g. Anderson et al. 2002, Adler and Wilkerson 2005), has been examined. Bills introduced by more pivotal members are theorized to be more

acceptable in their content to the chamber as a whole than bills sponsored by more extreme members.

Institutional characteristics also play a role in determining the success of legislation. A consistent finding is that bills referred to a committee of which the sponsor is a member are more likely to succeed. Members of the referral committee undoubtedly exhibit enhanced knowledge and expertise in the area of legislation beyond any effects due to specialization in bill authorship. These findings are even stronger in the case of committee leadership (Adler and Wilkerson 2005). In this latter case, it has been hypothesized that committee leaders are more adept at maneuvering in the “winnowing” process of reducing the large number of introduced bills to a more manageable number of bills receiving serious consideration (Krutz 2005). Similarly, the relative success of committee chairs may be due to their sponsorship of “clean bills” that are the result of the committee write-up process (Adler and Wilkerson 2005). Either way, these institutional prerogatives systematically enhance these members’ abilities to advance their legislation.

Signals of broad support for a piece of legislation are also important in predicting the success of an introduced bill. The foremost means of signaling support in the U.S. Congress is through cosponsorship. The signaling characteristics of cosponsorship are hypothesized to indicate that a bill has wide support across parties and ideology. Additionally, cosponsorship can also be motivated by bandwagon considerations, as members sign on to bills likely to pass (Wilson and Young 1997). Cosponsorship, however, appears to be of only limited importance, serving to indicate viability at early stages in the legislative process in committee and helping at times to move legislation out of committee, rather than helping bills pass.

A few other factors were associated with bill advancement in some previous studies. The tenure of a member has also shown mixed results, being found to be both related (Franzitch 1979; Hibbing 1991, Krutz 2005) and unrelated (Moore and Thomas 1991) with legislative success.

Anderson et al. (2003) develop an issue-based typology to distinguish “local” bills and “hot” bills from other legislation, finding that these two types of bills are more likely to pass. Krutz (2005) singles out bills that are priorities of the presidential administration. Adler and Wilkerson (2005) produce a two-fold typology based on the importance and urgency of legislation. Bills that are either of low importance and urgency or high importance and urgency are more likely to pass than other bills which fall under an umbrella of “discretionary” legislation, which tend to be bills of high importance but low urgency.

One set of actors in the legislative process that has been absent in these studies, however, are interest groups. Frequently noted in area-specific studies of policy change, they have not been addressed in any systematic manner. The impact of cosponsorship has been shown to be limited; might interest group support instead serve to indicate broad support for a piece of legislation? We move to consider their potential role and how their impact can be analyzed.

Can Interest Groups Help?

The impact of interest groups on legislation has been most commonly investigated by assessing the role of Political Action Committee contributions in legislative voting. This literature has found no consistent effects of PAC contributions (Wawro 2001) on roll call votes. Wright (1990) argues that both the focus on floor votes as the outcome of interest and the focus on PAC contributions as the mechanism of interest group influence are both misplaced. Interest group influence is larger at the committee stage, according to Wright, and lobbying is more influential than campaign contributions. Milyo et al. (2000) find that corporations spend substantially more on lobbying than on contributing to campaigns, suggesting that they agree lobbying is more influential.

Hall and Wayman (1990) agree that interest group influence is more likely at the committee stage, but argue that interest group support rarely changes votes; instead, it raises the level of

legislator involvement in legislation supported by the group. Hall and Deardorff (2006) advance this argument, theorizing that interest groups improve the capacity of legislators that already support their bills by providing a subsidy that helps them pursue their shared goals. Researchers have not found direct evidence that interest group support changes votes, in other words, so they have theorized that it must play some other role in advancing the bills that they support.

We explore the impact of two potential routes by which interest group support may help bills move forward in the legislative process: via a formal announced coalition of interest groups in support of the bill or via active lobbying by one or more groups on the issues before Congress. There is an active literature on both forms of attempted influence but neither has yet to be joined with the literature on bill success.

The emphasis of the interest group coalition literature is on whether interest groups should join coalitions and how they mobilize resources, rather than their impact. Hula (1999), for example, investigated successful interest group coalitions to find out how they mobilized group members. Hojnacki (1997) sees interest group coalitions as an opportunity to share resources to achieve collective lobbying goals. She finds that coalitions are not always an optimal strategy for interest groups; the alternative path of lobbying independently means that there is always a collective action problem facing potential coalition partners considering acting together. Hula (1999) sees interest group coalitions as a signaling device, in addition to a resource sharing arrangement. Many interest groups, he shows, join coalitions without becoming core members dedicating many resources. Heinz et al. (1987) investigate stable patterns of interest group alliances to find the structure of divisions within policy areas. They find some issue areas in which issue specialists join together in small cliques and other areas in which there are two stable sides. In this analysis, interest group coalitions serve as indicators of the sides of policy debates rather than active efforts behind specific legislation.

Grossmann and Dominguez (2009) use interest group coalitions to investigate the ties between interest groups and political parties. They compare affiliation networks of interest groups that endorse the same candidates, contribute financially to the same legislators, and sign on to the same legislative coalitions. They find that interest group legislative coalitions are frequently large and bipartisan, in contrast to electoral coalitions. They speculate that interest groups may need to join these coalitions to help build the broad support that helps pass legislation. For an analysis of bill passage, the hypothesis from this research would be that having an interest group coalition behind legislation makes it more likely to pass; similarly, bills with opposing interest group coalitions should be more likely to fail. This may also be an implicit assumption of Hula (1999) but he does not explicitly claim that interest group coalitions help move legislation forward. If interest groups do not help in the legislative process, however, their utility is not very clear.

Interest group coalitions in support for legislation, however, may not arise spontaneously from interest group efforts alone. Shaiko (1998) claims that legislators often solicit support from interest groups in an attempt to signal broader support and gain additional staff support for their initiatives. These legislators believe that interest groups are important allies in the legislative process. Arnold (1990) shows that to pass major legislation, Members of Congress need to construct supermajority coalitions that include legislators and stakeholder constituencies. Members of Congress identify attentive and inattentive publics who might care about an issue and estimate their preferences and the probability of translating these into public policy. He finds that the Congressional leadership seeks to bring in many coalition partners early in the process and often uses persuasive lobbying and public opinion campaigns to move legislation. If Members of Congress are seeking to bring more outside participants on board, often enlisting interest groups and their constituencies in the process, it may make sense to build a list of organized supporters. In these arguments, legislators seek interest group supporters because they believe it is a viable tool to help

move legislation forward. This is consistent with the notion that interest groups offer a subsidy to Members of Congress. Both interest groups and legislators, therefore, seem to operate under the assumption that building a list of supportive interest groups is part of the legislative process; singing on interest group supporters is seen as an effective strategy.

Joining coalitions that can be announced by legislators, of course, is only one method by which interest groups might seek to influence legislation. The more common method is lobbying. Baumgartner et al. (2009) review policy issues on which there is active lobbying and find involvement by interest groups in many legislative battles. They find that many issues have interest group lobbying on both sides, sometimes tied to specific legislation and sometimes tied to more general policy goals. Because they identified policy issues primarily by interviewing lobbyists, however, they only review policy debates that have some level of interest group involvement; they do not compare these issue debates to those on which there is little or no group involvement.

Among the issues involving interest groups, Baumgartner et al. (2009) examine the factors that determine success and failure. They conclude that opponents of policy change have tremendous advantages compared to proponents, because of built-in biases toward the status quo. They also conclude that moneyed interests do not always prevail over other groups, because groups with fewer monetary resources have some other tools and allies at their disposal. Even though they find little evidence of successful attempts by interest groups to change public policy, however, they conclude that interest group influence may be baked in to the status quo; current policy, in this view, is already a consequence of the success of the most influential interest groups in previous battles. Yet this is an untested assumption.

For both interest group coalitions and lobbying, the literature shows that attempts at interest group influence occur regularly and are not automatically associated with success. Yet this leaves open the more basic question of whether interest group support helps bring about policy change.

One important piece of this question is whether legislation advances further through Congress if it has the formal support of a coalition of interest groups or if interest groups are actively lobbying on its behalf. Just as important, scholars need to know whether active interest group opposition makes it less likely that bills will move forward.

Data and Method

In order to examine the efficacy of interest group coalitions and lobbying within the legislative process, we must first define a population of coalitions and lobbying attempts. Our data on coalitions comes from lists of supportive interest groups announced by Members of Congress in the Congressional Record for the 106th and 107th Congresses. To locate the coalitions, we began with a list of interest groups that rate Members of Congress (from McKay 2008) and snowball sampled from that list, searching the Record for mentions of those groups in coalitions, and any others mentioned with them, ultimately finding more than 2,500 organizations mentioned in coalitions in the Congressional Record. We found 319 legislative coalitions over the four-year period (though not all were associated with a complete bill). These same pro and con coalitions were previously used to create networks of interest groups that support the same legislation (see Grossmann and Dominguez 2009).

To identify lobbying on Congressional bills, we relied on evidence collected by Baumgartner et al. (2009) through the *Advocacy and Public Policymaking Project*.⁴ Because the project was organized around issues, however, we had to match interest group lobbying activities to specific bills.

Thankfully, the project website lists all bills associated with each of the issues they cover. To connect

⁴ The project was supported by National Science Foundation grants: #SBR-9905195 for the period of 1999 and 2000 and #SES-0111224 for the period of 2001 to 2003. The information that we used is made publicly available at <http://lobby.psu.edu>. We sincerely thank Frank Baumgartner, Jeffrey Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David Kimball, and Beth Leech for publicly sharing their data. The views expressed are those of the authors and not the National Science Foundation.

bills to lobbying activities, we used Table A.1 of the appendix in Baumgartner et al. (2009), where the authors break down every policy issue they cover into the specific areas where there were proponents or opponents. We matched the bills listed on the project website to these issue provisions, finding 552 bills with associated lobbying including some with lobbying on one side and some with lobbying for and against. This involved inferring that if there was lobbying for or against the content of the provisions of a bill, we could assume that the bills were tied to lobbying. Lobbying took place around the main issue in these pieces of legislation, therefore, but did not necessarily involve attempts by interest groups to influence the advancement of specific bills.

The existence of interest group support or opposition is measured through binary variables in our analyses. Bills that feature an interest group coalition in favor of the given bill receive a one on an this variable, and those that feature an interest group coalition against the bill receive a one on another variable. Bills that feature known lobbying for or against their provisions receive a one on another two variables.

The unique feature of our project is to combine these datasets with data on all legislation. We examine non-commemorative bills introduced in the 106th and 107th Congresses in both the House and Senate. Our analysis utilizes information on these bills from the *Congressional Bills Project* (Adler and Wilkerson 2008), supplemented by additional research.⁵ Our analysis uses as dependent variables binary measures indicating whether a given bill has been reported from committee, been passed in the chamber in which it was introduced, and whether the bill was passed given that it has been reported from committee. In the 106th House, 576 non-commemorative bills were reported from committee; of these, 433 passed and 143 did not. In the Senate case, 508 bills were reported,

⁵ The project was supported by National Science Foundation grants #00880066 and #00880061. The information that we used is made publicly available at <http://congressionalbills.org>. We sincerely thank E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson for making this information publicly available. The views expressed are those of the authors and not the National Science Foundation.

of which 328 passed and 180 did not. In total, 594 bills authored by representatives passed the House and 347 authored by senators passed the Senate in the 106th Congress.⁶ In the 107th House, 497 bills were reported from committee and 365 passed. In the 107th Senate, 375 bills were reported from committee and 135 passed. Unsurprisingly, a higher percentage of bills reported in the Senate from committee fail to pass, most likely due to the chamber's supermajoritarian institutions. Due to the binary nature of each of the dependent variables discussed above, we examine bill progress using logistic regression.

A number of other explanations for bill success from past studies are also included as controls. First and most simply, a binary measure flags whether a bill's sponsor is a member of the majority party.⁷ A second measure counts the number of cosponsors for a given bill. In the House, the mean number of cosponsors was 17.82, with a median of 3 and maximum of 403; for the Senate, the mean was 5.01, with a median of one and maximum of 99. Higher number of cosponsors should indicate greater levels of support within the chamber for the bill.

Three measures indicate whether the sponsor is involved in the committee of referral for a given bill. The first measure simply measures whether the bill sponsor is on a committee of referral. Two other measures indicate whether the sponsor is the chair of a committee of referral or ranking

⁶ These numbers exceed the totals for those bills reported from committee due to the set of bills considered without being reported from committee. In the House, this is most often achieved via suspension of the rules. In the 106th and 107th Houses, 1,140 bills were considered under this rule (Carr 2005, 10), of which only around 60% were reported from committee (Carr 2005, 4). Such bills generally pass (only twelve failed during the period of this study) (Carr 2005, 11). In our analysis, 358 bills in the House passed the chamber without being reported from committee. The Rules Committee also has the power to extract bills from committee (Oleszek 2004, 143-144). Though bill floor consideration without committee reporting occurs less often in the Senate (83 bills in our analysis), it is generally far easier to bypass committee action in the Senate and consider a bill using a unanimous consent agreement (Oleszek 2004, 102).

⁷ *Congressional Bills Project* data does not appear to account for changes in party control during the 107th Senate. On June 6th, 2001, James Jeffords switched from caucusing with the Republicans to the Democrats, shifting the majority party and leading to a power-sharing agreement and a shift in committee leadership.

minority member.⁸ Membership on the committee of referral should indicate a greater familiarity with the bill topic along with greater ability to move the bill along, particularly for chairs and possibly also for ranking members. Chairs also have the added benefit of sponsoring marked-up versions of bills that frequently move on to the chamber floor.

Two final measures indicate the ideological centrality of the bill sponsor. The first indicator measures the absolute distance of the bill sponsor's ideology (measured by first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores) from the party median, and the second indicator measures the ideological distance to the chamber median. Members that are less extreme than others in their party may be more likely to succeed in the committee environment, but Members near the chamber median may be more likely to succeed once bills reach the floor. We also ran models using dummies measuring bill topic for each of the *Policy Agendas Project* categories to account for systematic differences across bills of differing content. These results are not presented here, as the general findings are similar; where differences occur, these are noted in footnotes.

Results

The first important finding is that interest groups are directly involved in promoting or opposing only a small minority of bills in Congress. Table 1 reports cross-tabulations of pro and con interest group involvement for the House and Senate. Less than 1% of House bills and less than 2% of Senate bills had an announced coalition of interest group supporters or opponents. Less than 3% of House bills and just over 3% of Senate bills were associated with known lobbying, in favor or

⁸ For the 106th Congress, we modified *Congressional Bills Project* data for cases where a member changed committee membership in the midst of a term to correct an error. Bills are given a 1 only when a bill was introduced during the Member's tenure on that committee. Members who spent the entire term on a committee are given 1s for all bills referred to that committee regardless of their starting date. We made no modification to *Congressional Bills Project* data for the 107th Congress.

opposition.⁹ This could indicate that typical studies of interest groups in political science focus on an unrepresentative group of policy issues. There may be selection bias in our studies of how interest groups impact legislation if we only look at issues where they are involved.

[Insert Table 1 here]

There is a substantial difference between the two types of interest group involvement in the likelihood of support and opposition. Coalitions of interest groups are much more likely to be assembled in support of legislation, rather than opposed to it. 66% of House bills and 83% of Senate bills with coalitions had only an announced coalition in favor of the bill. In contrast, approximately 80% of bills on which there was known lobbying included lobbying in support and opposition. Interest groups may be more willing to work behind the scenes lobbying against a bill than to come out in public opposition. Yet there are bills that had announced coalitions of opponents without announced supporters whereas we found no bills that had lobbying against but no lobbying in favor.

There were also differences in the issue areas associated with the two types of interest group involvement. Table 2 reviews the issue areas most likely to involve interest group coalitions and known lobbying. Announced coalitions occurred around a broader range of issues but were not common in any individual issue area. A given bill involving civil rights and liberties was the most likely to have supportive coalitions in the House and the Senate. Lobbying for and against legislation was most likely around science and technology issues; it was also relatively common on legislation related to health and energy.¹⁰ Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no policy area involved active

⁹ This likely underestimates lobbying involvement because Baumgartner et al. (2009) do not assemble a complete list of issues on which groups were lobbying. They sampled lobbyists and asked each person for the first issue on which they were working. This random sampling, however, should not affect our estimates of the influence of interest group lobbying.

¹⁰ Science and technology policy did not account for a large number of total bill introductions in either Congress; of this small number of bills, many involved interest group lobbying. This does not indicate that a large proportion of lobbying attempts were within this category, however. Health and energy account for a larger share of both introduced legislation and lobbying attempts.

interest group support or opposition around more than one in five bills. It is quite likely that many legislators introduce bills without generating active interest group or lobbying support or opposition.

[Insert Table 2 here]

The key question is whether the bills that do generate interest group support or lobbying make it further in the legislative process. Table 3 presents our models of the entire population of non-commemorative House bills for the 106th and 107th Congresses, seeking to find the factors associated with bill success as measured by being reported from committee and passed by the full chamber.¹¹ We include two models each for committee reporting and passage; one set of models includes variables measuring announced interest group coalitions whereas the other set includes variables measuring known interest group lobbying. We include a dummy variable to account for differences in rates of success between the 106th and 107th Congresses.¹² If interest groups influence the success of legislation, interest group coalitions and lobbying in favor of a bill should be expected to aid a bill in its progress through the legislative labyrinth; coalitions and lobbying opposed to a bill should detract from its progress.

[Insert Table 3 here]

The results of these models are generally unsurprising. Bills sponsored by a majority party member are more likely to be reported from the committee of referral than those of the minority. They are also more likely to pass the chamber. Similarly, bills sponsored by a member of the committee of referral or the committee chair are more likely to be reported and pass the chamber. The same is not true of ranking minority members, but this result is not surprising given that, in the end, reporting and chamber passage are a result of majority votes. The number of cosponsors is also

¹¹ A model including dummies measuring bill topic for each category of the *Policy Agendas Project* showed no significant differences.

¹² We include this variable in all of the models reported here. Without pooling the two Congresses, we obtained substantially similar results.

associated with whether a bill is reported and passed – bills with more cosponsors are more likely to be reported and passed. Both ideological distance measures are also statistically significant. Bills sponsored by ideologically extreme party members and chamber members are less likely to be reported and passed.

The presence of both a pro and a con interest group coalition are significantly associated with a bill being reported from committee and passed. Though the pro finding is unsurprising, the con result is striking. Given the origin of these coalitions as announcements in the *Congressional Record*, both findings are likely due to the selection process. Few bills get floor discussion in the House that would appear in the *Congressional Record* before they are reported from committee. This is due to the rules for speaking on the floor in the chamber, which minimize debate of unreported bills. Bills that feature both supportive and opposed interest group coalitions are likely to be those that feature enough support to be brought to a floor vote; interest groups may sign on to support or oppose bills only after they threaten to pass or we may just not observe interest group coalitions formed before bills make it to a floor vote.

We confirmed this interpretation in separate models where we considered only the set of coalitions that were announced *prior* to floor consideration. Because this is a much smaller set of coalitions, the results are not definitive. Pro and con coalitions in these models, however, had no effect on bill passage. Interest group coalitions are of little utility with regards to bill passage at least for the small number that included coalitions announced prior to floor debate. The most likely interpretation of the positive results in Table 3, then, is that coalitions are sometimes associated with success only because we observe coalitions after they have reached floor debate.

Lobbying in favor of legislation also has no significant effect on reporting from committee or passage in the House; the sign of the coefficients for both are also negative. Interest group lobbying against legislation also has no significant effect on reporting or passage and the direction of

the coefficients is again counter to the notion of interest group influence; they are negative. Bills with associated lobbying do not advance through the legislative process in the House differently than other bills. The results suggest that bills that Members of Congress themselves advocate, without interest groups support, are just as likely to move forward; the same appears to be true of bills that Members, rather than interest groups, take the lead in opposing. Even though one might expect interest groups to only lobby on issues after the relevant bills make it further in the process, the insignificant coefficients we observe also provide no evidence for reverse causality.

The same may not be the case in the Senate, the models to which we turn in Table 4.¹³ The results have shifted somewhat, especially in illustrating the lesser influence that partisanship plays in bill advancement in the Senate. Majority party sponsorship is significantly associated with committee reporting but not passage. Ideological distance from the Senate median is negatively associated with both reporting and passage, but ideological distance from the party median is insignificant. Though committee chair sponsorship is still a significant predictor of committee reporting and bill passage, ranking minority member sponsorship is also significantly associated with reporting and passage. These findings likely reflect the need to build broader support for bills to overcome the filibuster hurdle in a closely divided Senate. The number of cosponsors is again significant for reporting and passage. Committee membership, however, is now associated only with reporting. Bills in the 107th Senate were less likely to pass than bills from the 106th Senate.

[Insert Table 4 here]

The existence of a pro interest group coalition is not significantly associated with a bill being reported or passing the Senate, but having a con interest group coalition counterintuitively predicts

¹³ In models that contain controls for issue topics, ideological distance from the chamber median is not significant, nor is announced coalitions against a bill in the passage model. For the models with lobbying measures and issue codes, being a member of the majority party is also positive and significant. We found no other significant differences.

success. This is the opposite of what would be expected if interest group support helps bills move forward but is consistent with the findings from the House. We again sought to run models where we considered only the set of coalitions that were announced *prior* to floor consideration. No coalitions, however, were announced prior to floor debate. Again, coalitions opposed to legislation are only associated with success because we observe coalitions after they have reached floor debate.

The results for lobbying on Senate bills also fail to match theories that expect interest group influence. Interest group lobbying in favor of a bill is negatively associated with reporting from committee. Interest group lobbying against a bill is not associated with reporting or passage. The signs of all coefficients are again the opposite of what we would expect from interest group influence. If there is any association, interest groups appear to be fighting losing battles; they lobby on behalf of bills that do not make it far and lobby against those that do move forward. The results suggest that senators can lobby on behalf of their own bills or against those of their colleagues just as effectively, without involving outside interests.

To better understand the incongruities and track the multiple steps in the legislative process, we consider whether bills that are reported out of committee end up passing their chamber. The results for both the House and the Senate are shown in Table 5. The House models demonstrate that predicting passage given that a bill was reported from committee is difficult, with little variation explained by any of the variables. Indeed, one of the House models predicts passage no better than random chance.¹⁴ Committee membership is now negatively associated with bill passage, suggesting that committee members are able to convince their fellow members to report their bills even if they are unlikely to pass. The Senate models also reveal regularities that are counterintuitive. Both being

¹⁴ In the model that contains controls for issue topics, more variation is explained because bills on some topic areas are more likely to pass than others. The p-value for having a committee chair author rises to just over .05 in the model of Senate passage with the lobbying measure and issue topic controls.

the chair of the committee of referral and a member of the majority party are significantly associated with a *decrease* in the likelihood of bill passage. Committee chairs and majority caucus members may be rewarded with symbolic advancement of their bills through committee even if they have little chance of passage. Co-sponsorship is no longer significantly associated with bill passage in the House or the Senate. Cosponsors appear to only help bills make it out of committee.

[Insert Table 5 here]

The results for interest group coalitions and lobbying are mixed. Interest group coalitions appear to help reported bills pass in the House. As we noted earlier, however, the significance is likely due to the fact that many coalitions were announced in floor debate; we are more likely to observe interest group coalitions when the House leadership decides to bring a reported bill to a vote. The bills where we can observe coalitions are thus biased toward bill progress. The other coefficients for interest group coalitions do not reach significance, but are all positive. The results for interest group lobbying confirm the previous non-significant findings. Interest group lobbying in favor of a bill is not significantly associated with passage of reported bills in either house of Congress. The same is true of interest group lobbying against the terms of a bill.

Why Gather Interest Group Support? Why Lobby?

Given these findings, why do legislators spend limited resources building lists of interest group supporters or opponents of legislation and why do interest groups spend time lobbying for or against legislation? We see three possibilities. First, only some types of lobbying or coalitions may be influential. Second, legislators and interest groups may be flying blind when it comes to passing legislation, trying everything that may have some effect without knowing what truly works. Third, interest groups and legislators may have “position taking” incentives that do not rely on influencing the passage of legislation. We consider each possibility in turn.

Our findings may be incomplete if only particular types of interest group coalitions or lobbying are influential or if other unmeasured causal variables are positively associated with interest group coalitions and negatively associated with bill success.¹⁵ In another analysis, however, we assessed whether particular types of interest group coalition are associated with success. The results indicate that neither large nor bipartisan coalitions are more likely to succeed. Coalitions with central actors in interest group networks are also no more likely to lead to bill success or failure. Baumgartner et al. (2009) similarly fail to find many differences in success or failure of interest group lobbying that results from the types of groups involved, their resources, or their tactics. They find that interest groups in favor of the status quo have many advantages. Yet the results presented here show that the status quo advantage extends to legislation that does not involve interest groups as well. A bill is always much more likely to go nowhere than to pass. Baumgartner et al. (2009) theorize that the status quo may incorporate past interest group influence; yet it just as possible that the advantage of the status quo has nothing to do with interest groups.

We are unable to test the possibility of unmeasured confounding variables. It may be that legislators seek interest group coalitions when they do not have an “insider” path to success through the legislative process. If interest group coalitions develop disproportionately when direct routes to success through party leadership or Presidential support are unavailable, we would observe a lack of relationship even if some coalitions were influential. Given that the anecdotal coalitions with which we are most familiar formed around major legislation that did have leadership support, however, we doubt this possibility. A more likely possibility is that bills that feature stated interest group coalitions may be more contentious than the usual bill and especially unlikely to receive

¹⁵ It is possible that we were unable to find some interest group coalitions because we used the *Congressional Record* to locate interest group coalitions. Finding interest group coalitions in media coverage prior to bill introduction would allow another test of whether supported bills advance further. Given our measurement of both announced interest group coalitions and behind the scenes lobbying, however, we are more confident in our results.

consideration via suspension of the rules. This alternative interpretation would suggest that all controversial bills that go through the committee process rarely succeed, including those with and without interest group coalitions. Yet again, this explanation only plausibly provides an interpretation for the lack of influence for announced interest group coalitions. Behind the scenes lobbying initiated by interest groups should not be subject to the same dynamics. The most direct interpretation is that interest group support does not impact bill advancement.

The second interpretation of our results may be more fruitful. Perhaps legislators and interest groups both lack knowledge about how to move legislation forward but possess strong incentives to try whatever strategies might lead to success. Public activists often create petitions or stage protests even when they are unlikely to be influential, after all, so perhaps the actors that we think of as insiders pursue long shots as well. There is incomplete and imperfect information about what makes some bills move forward. Particularly in the pursuit of bill passage, we have shown that almost no known variable systematically helps move bills out of committee and then from committee reports to passage in either chamber. This unexplained variation may lead to a broad strategy by legislators and interest groups of trying anything. There is also a strong possibility that some interest groups and legislators perceive interest group coalitions as more influential than we have found. Our results for the House of Representatives showed that bill passage is associated with announced interest group coalitions by the end of the process. Our anecdotes also make it clear that some extensively covered legislative processes involve building interest group coalitions. Perhaps politicians and interest group leaders make the same initial mistake that we did: they notice the prominent examples and forget the many unsuccessful cases. Our analysis of bill passage given committee reporting also shows that this may apply to other variables previously considered important, like majority sponsorship and cosponsors. We may know little about the winnowing process at the stage of the legislative process between committee reporting and passage. We risk

conflating our knowledge of committee success with evidence of chamber success despite the possible trade-off associated with symbolic reporting of chair and majority member bills out of committee even if they are unlikely to pass.

The final “position taking” interpretation of our results is also plausible. Interest groups have some incentive to engage in credit claiming, signing on to or lobbying on behalf of bills that are likely to pass even if they have little role in their passage. This might help interest groups recruit members, raise fundraising dollars, or develop reputations of power. Yet this would suggest the opposite of what we observe, little association. Position taking incentives, however, may be just as important. Interest groups may sign on to bills just to have their names attached to ideas that are unlikely to produce results. Single-issue groups, for example, often highlight bill introductions in their areas of interest. Perhaps groups promoting drug decriminalization, death penalty bans, anti-abortion constitutional amendments, or all manner of other unlikely proposals enjoy being associated with introduced legislation, even if it is going nowhere. At least supporting or opposing a bill in Congress makes it look like you are doing something to advance your agenda. Lobbying may be subject to similar dynamics, but the interest group leaders interviewed by Baumgartner et al. (2009) did not seem to believe that they were engaged in lobbying only for show.

Legislators may also have position taking incentives to attach their bills to interest groups, but these incentives are less clear. The obvious case would be allying with interest groups that endorse candidates or donate money to legislators; yet previous research on the same coalitions studied here (Grossmann and Dominguez 2009) found that most interest groups in legislative coalitions do not engage in campaigns or candidate fundraising at all. Perhaps having a list of interest group supporters just helps provide some modicum of legitimacy to bill introductions or positions a legislator as a particular type of member that shares the concerns of particular constituencies.

Conclusion

Neither interest group lobbying nor interest group coalitions appear to help bills advance through Congress. Lobbying and coalitions in opposition to legislation also do not systematically impede the progress of legislation. The failure of the scholarly record to consistently show interest group influence (see Wawro 2001) may not be a product of the focus on PAC contributions rather than lobbying, as expected by Milyo et al (2000). It may not be a product of the focus on floor votes rather than committees, as expected by Wright (1990) and Hall and Wayman (1990). Interest group support or opposition may simply not be a large part of the explanation for legislative success or failure. We have not refuted previous findings that lobbying increases legislative effort or may change votes under some circumstances, of course. Yet in aggregate, interest groups do not help to explain why some bills become law and others do not.

Extant literature has responded to the lack of consistent findings of interest group impact by reconceptualizing lobbying. Hall and Deardorff (2006) suggest that interest groups improve legislative capacity by subsidizing the work of legislators. Baumgartner et al. (2009) suggest that interest groups may primarily be influential in opposing change. Yet these alternatives still envision a role for interest groups in determining outcomes, either by helping their side in the legislature or through successful opposition. Our results find neither outcome, suggesting that bill advancement is a product of Congressional factors rather than factors related to interest groups.

Where does this leave us in explaining how a bill becomes a law? We are unable to challenge the conventional story that emphasizes the legislators most involved in each stage of the process but we do revise the analysis. We confirm the important role of partisanship and committee leadership, but we show that it explains House actions more than Senate actions and that it fails to explain anything beyond the committee stage. Along with some underappreciated previous research (see Carr 2005; Oleszek 2004), we confirm that the successful lawmaking process frequently evades the

committee reporting stage. Similarly, we find that the effects of cosponsorship and ideology are most evident before bills are reported from committee. The conventional story of how a bill becomes a law is thus incomplete. Yet it would be inaccurate to suggest that policymaking now proceeds outside of Congress via agreement among interest groups or through lobbying. Certainly, announcing an interest group coalition is not enough to build legislative support. Interest group lobbying also does not appear to lead to success or failure.

Yet the conventional story answers more about how a bill becomes a law than why some bills die when others advance. We still have a lot of unexplained variation in trying to assess bill passage, especially when it comes to bills that do not require committee consideration. We also lack much of an explanation for how bills make it from committee reporting to floor passage. With regard to the role of interest groups, scholars should consider two possibilities: (1) interest groups and the legislators that seek their support may pursue unsuccessful strategies because they incorrectly believe that they influence legislation or (2) much of interest group behavior and legislative behavior involving groups may be driven by position taking incentives rather than policymaking attempts. Interest groups may be part of the story of how a bill becomes a law, but not through direct lobbying or signaling via coalitions. We cannot yet call for an interest group lobbyist to be included in the next iteration of “I’m Just a Bill.”

Table 1: Crosstabulation of Announced Coalitions and Lobbying in 106th and 107th Congresses

	106th and 107th House	
Announced Coalitions	No Announced Coalition Against Bill	Announced Coalition Against Bill
No Announced Coalition in Favor of Bill	11372	22
Announced Coalition in Favor of Bill	50	4
Lobbying	No Known Lobbying Against Bill	Lobbying Against Bill
No Known Lobbying in Favor of Bill	11115	0
Lobbying in Favor of Bill	65	268
	106th and 107th Senate	
Announced Coalitions	No Announced Coalition Against Bill	Announced Coalition Against Bill
No Announced Coalition in Favor of Bill	6348	17
Announced Coalition in Favor of Bill	99	4
Lobbying	No Known Lobbying Against Bill	Lobbying Against Bill
No Known Lobbying in Favor of Bill	6249	0
Lobbying in Favor of Bill	47	172

Table 2: Issue Areas Most Likely to Have Announced Coalitions and Lobbying

106th and 107th House	
Announced Coalitions in Favor	Announced Coalitions Against
Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties – 1.66%	Community Development and Housing Issues – 1.55%
Social Welfare – 1.63%	Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties – 0.83%
Space, Science, Technology, and Communications – 1.53%	Government Operations – 0.63%
Known Lobbying in Favor	Known Lobbying Against
Space, Science, Technology, and Communications – 11.49%	Space, Science, Technology, and Communications – 10.34%
Health – 6.37%	Energy – 4.62%
Education – 5.19%	Health – 4.37%
106th and 107th Senate	
Announced Coalitions in Favor	Announced Coalitions Against
Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties – 6.25%	Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce – 1.09%
Labor, Employment, and Immigration – 3.22%	Agriculture – 0.88%
Health – 2.93%	Government Operations – 0.73%
Known Lobbying in Favor	Known Lobbying Against
Space, Science, Technology, and Communications – 17.95%	Space, Science, Technology, and Communications – 16.03%
Energy – 6.38%	Energy – 5.96%
Health – 6.33%	Agriculture – 5.29%

Table 3: Models of House Bill Advancement in the 106th and 107th Congresses

		All Non-Commemorative House Bills			
		Announced Coalitions		Lobbying	
		Reported by Committee	Passed the House	Reported by Committee	Passed the House
		Logit Coefficients	Logit Coefficients	Logit Coefficients	Logit Coefficients
Member of Majority Party		.83* (.12)	.84* (.12)	.88* (.12)	.89* (.11)
Ideological Distance from Chamber Median		-.80* (.23)	-.83* (.22)	-.78* (.23)	-.79* (.22)
Ideological Distance from Party Median		-.85* (.33)	-.72* (.32)	-.88* (.33)	-.76* (.31)
Announced Group Coalition in Favor of Bill		2.47* (.34)	3.52* (.41)	--	--
Announced Group Coalition Against Bill		2.89* (.53)	3.90* (.75)	--	--
Interest Group Lobbying in Favor of Bill		--	--	-.84 (.61)	-.89 (.61)
Interest Group Lobbying Against Bill		--	--	.96 (.64)	.91 (.64)
Number of Cosponsors		0.0033* (0.00076)	0.0030* (0.00075)	0.0040* (.00073)	0.0039* (0.00072)
Referral Committee	Member	.98* (.078)	.64* (.073)	.98* (.077)	.64* (.072)
	Chair	1.51* (.11)	1.59* (.11)	1.53* (.11)	1.61* (.11)
	Ranking Minority Member	.44 (.24)	.17 (.27)	.42 (.24)	.13 (.27)
107 th Congress		-.11 (.070)	-.016 (.068)	-.10 (.069)	-.010 (.067)
Constant		-3.16	-2.91	-3.17	-2.93
Log Likelihood		-2955.73	-3144.70	-3003.58	-3225.32
N		11031	11031	11031	11031

Table entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients correspond to a model predicting whether bills will achieve at least the listed stage of bill progress. * $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

Table 4: Models of Senate Bill Advancement in the 106th and 107th Congresses

		All Non-Commemorative Senate Bills			
		Announced Coalitions		Lobbying	
		Reported by Committee	Passed the Senate	Reported by Committee	Passed the Senate
		Logit Coefficients	Logit Coefficients	Logit Coefficients	Logit Coefficients
Member of Majority Party		.45* (.097)	.16 (.12)	.46* (.098)	.16 (.12)
Ideological Distance from Chamber Median		-.58* (.24)	-.76* (.28)	-.59* (.24)	-.77* (.28)
Ideological Distance from Party Median		-.23 (.30)	-.096 (.35)	-.21 (.30)	-.058 (.35)
Announced Group Coalition in Favor of Bill		-.039 (.29)	.43 (.29)	--	--
Announced Group Coalition Against Bill		1.31* (.50)	1.44* (.49)	--	--
Interest Group Lobbying in Favor of Bill		--	--	-1.17* (.59)	-1.89 (1.03)
Interest Group Lobbying Against Bill		--	--	.19 (.65)	1.07 (1.08)
Number of Cosponsors		0.017* (0.0034)	0.014* (0.0040)	0.018* (.0034)	0.015* (0.0040)
Referral Committee	Member	.45* (.091)	-.087 (.11)	.45* (.091)	-.085 (.11)
	Chair	1.87* (.10)	1.13* (.13)	1.92* (.10)	1.19* (.13)
	Ranking Minority Member	.92* (.16)	.62* (.20)	.93* (.16)	.64* (.20)
107 th Congress		-.53* (.090)	-.55* (.11)	-.55* (.090)	-.58* (.11)
Constant		-2.20	-2.19	-2.17	-2.15
Log Likelihood		-2232.85	-1729.84	-2226.86	-1728.71
N		6242	6242	6242	6242

Table entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients correspond to a model predicting whether bills will achieve at least the listed stage of bill progress. * $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

Table 5: Models of Bill Passage for Bills Reported by Committee in the 106th and 107th Congresses

		Non-Commemorative Bills Reported from Committee			
		Announced Coalitions		Lobbying	
		Passed the House	Passed the Senate	Passed the House	Passed the Senate
		Logit Coefficients	Logit Coefficients	Logit Coefficients	Logit Coefficients
Member of Majority Party		.28 (.25)	-.70* (.18)	.30 (.25)	-.69* (.19)
Ideological Distance from Chamber Median		-.36 (.47)	-.00175 (.46)	-.39 (.46)	-.0046 (.46)
Ideological Distance from Party Median		.047 (.68)	.26 (.57)	.047 (.68)	.33 (.57)
Announced Group Coalition in Favor of Bill		1.28* (.61)	.40 (.53)	--	--
Announced Group Coalition Against Bill		1.66 (1.04)	.30 (.69)	--	--
Interest Group Lobbying in Favor of Bill		--	--	-.49 (1.26)	-.35 (1.20)
Interest Group Lobbying Against Bill		--	--	.93 (1.31)	-.79 (1.34)
Number of Cosponsors		-0.00039 (0.0014)	-0.0083 (0.0061)	0.00010 (.0015)	-0.0083 (0.0062)
Referral Committee	Member	-.44* (.19)	-.0055 (.20)	-.46* (.19)	-.0050 (.21)
	Chair	-.10 (.19)	-.40* (.17)	-.091 (.19)	-.35* (.17)
	Ranking Minority Member	-.37 (.48)	-.19 (.31)	-.37 (.48)	-.18 (.31)
107 th Congress		-.11 (.14)	-1.22* (.21)	-.096 (.14)	-1.23* (.21)
Constant		1.30	1.25	1.32	1.25
Log Likelihood		-589.84	-545.71	-594.52	-544.19
N		1052	866	1052	866

*Table entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients correspond to a model predicting whether a bill will pass the listed chamber given that it has been reported from committee. *p<.05 (two-tailed).*

References

- Adler, E. Scott and John Wilkerson. 2005. "The Scope and Urgency of Legislation: Reconsidering Bill Success in the House of Representatives." Paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.
- , 2008. Congressional Bills Project: 1999-2000, NSF 00880066 and 00880061.
< <http://www.congressionalbills.org/download.html>>.
- Anderson, William D., Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Valeria Sinclair Chapman. 2003. "The Keys to Legislative Success in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28 (3): 357-386.
- Arnold, Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech. 2009. *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carr, Thomas P. 2005. "Suspension of the Rules in the House of Representatives." *CRS Report* RL32474. Accessed via <<http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/CRS-RL32474.pdf>> on March 20, 2009.
- Clinton, Joshua D. and John Lapinski. 2008. "Laws and Roll Calls in the U.S. Congress, 1891-1994." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 33(4): 511-541.
- Franzitch, Stephen. 1979. "Who Makes Our Laws? The Legislative Effectiveness of Members of Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 5(3): 409-428.
- Grossmann, Matt and Casey Dominguez. 2009. "Party Coalitions and Interest Group Networks." *American Politics Research* 37(5): 767-800.
- Hall, Richard L. and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." *American Political Science Review* 10(1): 69-84.

- Hall, Richard L. and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." *American Political Science Review* 84 (3): 797-820.
- Hibbing, John. 1991. *Congressional Careers: Contours of Life in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Hojnacki, Marie. 1997. "Interest Groups' Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone." *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 61-87.
- Hula, Kevin W. 1999. *Lobbying Together: Interest Group Coalitions in Legislative Politics*. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
- Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury. *The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kays, Julie. 1995. "How a Bill Becomes a Law: The New Approach." *Harper's Magazine* 1 July, pg. 8.
- Krutz, Glenn. 2005. "Issues and Institutions: Winnowing in the U.S. Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 49: 313-326.
- Matthews, Donald R. 1959. "The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to Group Norms and Legislative Effectiveness." *American Political Science Review* 53: 1064-89.
- Mckay, Amy. 2008. "A Simple Method to Estimate Interest Group Ideology." *Public Choice* 136: 69-86.
- Milyo, Jeffrey, David Primo, and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. "Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective." *Business and Politics* 2(1): 1469.
- Moore, Michael K. and Susan Thomas. 1991. "Explaining Legislative Success in the U.S. Senate." *Western Political Quarterly* 44 (4): 959-970.
- Oleszek, Walter J. 2004. *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*. 6th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

- Olson, David M. and Cynthia T. Nonidez. 1972. "Measures of Legislative Performance in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. 16: 269-77.
- Pear, Robert. 2009. "Health Care Industry in Talks to Shape Policy." *New York Times* 19 February, pg. A16.
- Shaiko, Ronald G. 1998. "Reverse Lobbying: Interest Group Mobilization from the White House and the Hill." In *Interest Group Politics: Fifth Edition*. Washington: C.Q. Press, 255-281.
- Wawro, Gregory. 2001. "A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Votes." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 563-579.
- Wright, John R. 1990. "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 84(2): 417-438.
- Wilson, Rick and Cheryl Young. 1997. "Cosponsorship in the U.S. Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22 (1): 25-43.